The sudden jihadi offensive in Syria is a disaster. It is, first
of all, a disaster for the Syrian people. It's also a disaster for the
Palestinian people, Hezbollah, Iran, and the entire axis of anti-Zionist
resistance. And it's a disaster for Russia (and China) and the project of
replacing unipolar American hegemony with multipolarity based on a new BRICS-based
global political economy.
It's a disaster that challenges all the parties involved to
recognize that what they might have more comfortably treated as parallel but
separate conflicts are elements of one big, unavoidable war that is going to require
new strategies from each and from all of them together—strategies that
reconcile the interests of each with the interests of all. If that is possible.
It does no good to downplay the disaster-in-progress in
Syria. In short order—what can aptly be called a blitzkrieg—jihadi forces have
taken control of Aleppo, a city of over 2 million people and one of the oldest
continuously habited cities in the world, and Hama, a city of a million people,
with—and this is the crucial point—no significant resistance from the Syrian
Arab Army (SAA).
We can comfort ourselves by saying it’s a tactical retreat
and the Russian, Iranian, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi PMU cavalries are on the way.
These are potentially formidable forces, and we all saw how Russia and
Hezbollah helped the SAA defeat what seemed an unstoppable jihadi offensive from
2011 to 2019.
But, a) “Helped” is the operative word. The SAA fought like hell during that time, resisting every assault from a panoply of forces supported by the U.S., Israel, NATO, and Gulf monarchies, until Russia and Hezbollah came in and turned the tide. This time, the SAA melted away from two major Syrian cities in a week, despite knowing that the Idlib jihadis were arming up for an offensive. As I write, the jihadis are threatening Homs and have the momentum. There may not be enough time for Russian, and/or Iranian, and/or Iraqi forces to assemble and organize an effective defense, let alone counteroffensive, before Damascus is breached. Something has gone seriously wrong with the SAA, whether complacence, incompetence, and/or corruption (per Alexander Mercouris, who reports that the SAA Aleppo contingent simply defected), and foreign forces cannot replace what was a disciplined, dedicated SAA. If Assad needs an extended commitment of masses of foreign troops (which Russia never supplied) to stop the jihadis, Assad is toast. Russia and Iran can help Syria; turning it into a protectorate of Russia or Iran is another thing entirely.
